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Abstract
It is typically less profitable for an opportunistic borrower to divert
inputs than to divert cash. Therefore, suppliers may lend more liberally
than banks. This simple argument is at the core of our contract theoretic
model of trade credit in competitive markets. The model implies that
trade credit and bank credit can be either complements or substitutes
depending on, amongst other things, the borrower’s wealth. The model
also explains why firms both take and give costly trade credit even when
the borrowing rate exceeds the lending rate. Finally, the model suggests
reasons for why trade credit is more prevalent in less developed credit
markets and for why accounts payable of large unrated firms are more
countercyclical than those of small firms.
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1 Introduction
A remarkably stable feature of short term commercial lending is the central
role played by input suppliers.1 Suppliers not only sell goods and services, but
extend large amounts of credit as well. While trade credit is less important
nowadays than a century or two ago, it shows no signs of vanishing. Examining
the balance sheets of publicly listed non–ﬁnancial ﬁrms in the G7 countries,
Rajan and Zingales (1995) ﬁnd that accounts receivable vary from 13 percent
of assets in Canada and 18 percent in the US to 29 percent in France and Italy.
Accounts payable display less variation, ranging from 11.5 percent of assets in
Germany to 17 percent in France. For non–listed European ﬁrms numbers are
even larger (Giannetti, 2002).2 Generally, the volume of trade credit by far
exceeds the volume of short–term commercial bank credit. Understanding the
mechanics of trade credit is therefore important not only to corporate ﬁnance
specialists, but also to macroeconomists who want to investigate the credit
channel of monetary policy.
In the presence of specialized ﬁnancial institutions, it is puzzling that the
exchange of goods is bundled with a credit transaction. It is particularly hard
to understand why banks are unwilling to lend when suppliers, with inferior
access to funds, are willing to do so (Petersen and Rajan, 1997). After all,
a sizable fraction of ﬁrms end up regularly borrowing from their suppliers at
annual interest rates above 40 percent (Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Why do
not banks make these seemingly very proﬁtable loans instead?
A common explanation for trade credit is that suppliers have a monitoring
advantage over banks.3 In the course of business, suppliers obtain information
about the buyer which other lenders can only obtain at a cost, as argued by
Schwartz and Whitcomb (1978,1979), Emery (1987), Freixas (1993), Biais and
Gollier (1997), Jain (2001), among others. While the monitoring advantage
theory is intuitively appealing, we think it suﬀers from two shortcomings.
First, the literature has so far failed to give a convincing argument for why a
bank, being specialized in the evaluation of borrowers’ creditworthiness, would
1For an historical account, see for example Cameron (1967).
2Mian and Smith (1992) and Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide a closer examination of
the US data.
3Of course, this is not the only explanation for the existence of trade credit. Other
explanations are based on buyers’ private information about their own willingness or ability
to pay (Smith, 1987, and Brennan et al. 1988); on suppliers’ private information about
product quality (Smith, 1987, Long, Malitz and Ravid, 1993, and Lee and Stowe, 1993); on
suppliers’ advantage in liquidating collateral (Frank and Maksimovic, 1998); on tax effects
(Brick and Fung, 1984); on long–term buyer/seller relationships (Wilner, 2000); and on the
transaction costs of paying bills (Ferris, 1981).
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frequently have less information than suppliers. Second, if many suppliers have
information that banks do not have, why is their lending so closely tied to the
value of the input transaction? That is, the theory has not explained why
suppliers regularly lend inputs, but only very rarely lend cash.
In the present paper we propose a new theory of in–kind ﬁnance, based
on a fundamental monitoring advantage that input suppliers have over other
external creditors.4 We argue that the source of the suppliers’ informational
advantage is the input transaction itself. Unlike other creditors, an input
supplier automatically knows that an input transaction has been completed.
Other creditors can only obtain this information by incurring monitoring costs.
The value of input monitoring stems in turn from the fundamental diﬀerence
between inputs and cash. Cash is easily diverted, in particular if diversion
is interpreted broadly as any use of resources which does not maximize the
lenders’ expected return. In contrast, inputs are less easily diverted and hence
less subject to moral hazard. Hence, input illiquidity facilitates trade credit.
Another salient result of our model is that the availability of trade credit, by
mitigating the moral hazard problem, also boosts the supply of bank credit.
Our theory can explain why ﬁrms are willing to extend trade credit despite
having to take trade credit at a higher interest rate. In fact, the decision to
extend trade credit is often trivial. If all accounts receivable can be sold (to
a factoring company) or securitized, the own cost of capital is irrelevant to
the decision to extend trade credit: the operation is self–ﬁnancing. This argu-
ment also explains why the nominal trade credit interest rate is zero in many
industries. Essentially, suppliers are able to extend trade credit at the bank
interest rate. At the bank rate, buyers have no incentive to turn down the
loan. Hence, the interest rate might as well be included in the standard price
– i.e., the suppliers could oﬀer net terms exclusively. Only when receivables are
(partly) illiquid, and the suppliers as a group are suﬃciently poor, does a sup-
plier have to trade oﬀ real investment against investment in receivables. This
mechanism might explain why proﬁtable ﬁrms on average are more reluctant
to supply trade credit, as noted by Petersen and Rajan (1997). If proﬁtable
ﬁrms on average have a high marginal return on real investment, and if trade
credit extension is not entirely self–ﬁnancing, this is what our theory would
predict.5
4This is not to say that we provide a foundation for existing formal models. As will
become clear, our notion of monitoring is different from the notion captured by, for example,
Biais and Gollier (1997).
5Of course, if our theory is correct, profitability should not matter to trade credit supply
by firms that are unconstrained in the bank credit market. Similarly, profitability should not
matter less in industries where suppliers offer net terms. These are two of the predictions
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Variation across countries and across time can also be understood within
our model. With perfect legal protection of creditors, trade credit loses its edge,
because it becomes as diﬃcult to divert cash as to divert inputs. More gener-
ally, the importance of trade credit compared to bank credit should be greater
when creditor protection is weaker, and when ﬁrms are undercapitalized due
to entrepreneurs’ lack of wealth. This may explain why trade credit is a con-
siderably more important source of funding in Italy and France than in the US
and Canada. As for variation over the business cycle, Meltzer (1960) famously
argued that trade credit provides a cushion through which wealthy ﬁrms insure
poorer ﬁrms against the consequences of tight money. Our model explains why
the cushion is provided by most suppliers, not just the wealthy ones, and sug-
gests that the cushion against tight money is most valuable for entrepreneurs
with “intermediate” amounts of wealth. Very wealthy entrepreneurs don’t
need the cushion, and very poor entrepreneurs should see their trade credit
limits move in tandem with their bank credit limits in a credit slump. This
mechanism may explain Nilsen’s (2002) ﬁnding that trade credit is more coun-
tercyclical for large ﬁrms (except among ﬁrms with a bond rating, as these
ﬁrms never need to take costly trade credit).
At the core of our model is the conventional idea that moral hazard at the
investment stage gives rise to credit rationing of poor entrepreneurs. When
bank credit is the only source of funds, our competitive credit market model be-
haves like virtually any other model in the vast literature on credit rationing.6
The debt capacity increases in the borrowers wealth, in the quality of the
investment project, and in the level of creditor protection. Arguably, the ba-
sic model’s only remarkable feature is the ease with which overdraft facilities
emerge endogenously as equilibrium credit contracts. To this generic model we
add a competitive input market and our two crucial assumptions: (i) inputs
are less easily diverted than cash is, and (ii) input transactions are more easily
observed by suppliers (who take part in them) than by banks.
The general idea that illiquid assets facilitate borrowing has earlier been
explored by Myers and Rajan (1998). They argue that banks are able to
attract depositors precisely because their loan portfolios are relatively illiquid.
Our model is quite diﬀerent, as it relies on lender asymmetries: Suppliers lend
goods and services whereas banks lend cash. In the model of Myers and Rajan,
bank deposits are all cash, so there is no corresponding asymmetry between
lenders. In comparison with earlier theoretical work on trade credit, the most
that we hope to test in future work.
6As Holmstro¨m and Tirole (1997) point out, generic moral hazard models of credit ra-
tioning are useful because they give rise to a rich set of insights while maintaining a high
degree of tractability.
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closely related paper is Biais and Gollier (1997). Like us, they highlight the
relationship between trade credit and bank ﬁnance. However, we think that
their work is best seen as a general model of multiple lenders. Biais and
Gollier’s key assumption is that the bank and the supplier have diﬀerent signals
about the buyer’s creditworthiness; heterogeneous signals apart, there is no
diﬀerence between bank credit and trade credit.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model.
Section 3 studies the entrepreneurs’ borrowing and investment decision when
bank credit is the sole source of external funding. Section 4 introduces trade
credit and contains all the main results. Section 5 concludes. Mathematical
proofs are in the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a risk-neutral entrepreneur who has observable wealth, ω ≥ 0,
and has the opportunity to invest in a project. To begin with, we shall assume
that the wealth consists entirely of cash, but we modify this assumption later.
The entrepreneur’s objective is to maximize his return to ω.8
The entrepreneur has access to a project that transforms an input into
an output. (Multiple inputs would not aﬀect the basic insights, but require
tiresome additional notation.) Let q denote the amount of purchased input.
This quantity is observable to the input supplier, but not to outside parties
(the bank). We refer to the input quantity that is put into the project, I,
as the investment. The project transforms input into output according to the
production function Q(I) that is deterministic, increasing and concave. The
investment I is not veriﬁable to outsiders. The entrepreneur is a price taker
in both the input and the output markets; the input price is normalized to
1, and the output price is denoted by p. The revenues pQ are assumed to
be veriﬁable. In order to rule out trivial solutions, we assume that Q(0) = 0
(it is impossible to produce any output without input), and that pQ′(0) > 1
(neglecting interest rates, it is always proﬁtable to produce a strictly positive
quantity).
In the absence of wealth constraints, the optimal investment is given by
the solution to the ﬁrst–order condition pQ′(I) − 1 = 0. More generally, in a
7Another distinction between our work and that of Biais and Gollier is that they focus on
the problem of borrower screening whereas we are concerned with borrower moral hazard.
In screening models there is no obvious distinction between lending cash and lending inputs.
8The model can also be given other interpretations. E.g., the entrepreneur could be
thought of a manager acting in the interest of existing shareholders, who have provided the
equity capital ω.
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perfect credit market with an interest rate rB, the entrepreneur would ideally
want to implement the ﬁrst–best investment level, I∗(rB), where
pQ′(I∗) = 1 + rB. (1)
We assume that the entrepreneur is wealth constrained and cannot fund ﬁrst-
best investment internally, i.e., ω < I∗(rB). Apart from his wealth, the en-
trepreneur has two potential sources of funding, bank credit and trade credit.
The total supply of external funds is also going to be limited, because the
entrepreneur cannot commit to invest all available resources into the project.
More precisely, the entrepreneur may use (part of) the available resources to
generate non–veriﬁable private beneﬁts. We refer to such activities as diver-
sion.
While both output and sales revenues are veriﬁable and can therefore be
pledged to outside investors, neither the input purchase nor the investment
decision are contractible. Thus, the entrepreneur enjoys project returns only
after honoring all repayment obligations. Diverted resources, on the other
hand, can be enjoyed in full and are only repaid to the extent that project
returns are available. If all resources are diverted, nothing is repaid. The
assumption that diverted resources yield zero return to outside investors is for
simplicity only.9
Crucial to the model is that the two sources of external funding diﬀer in
their exposure to moral hazard. Each unit of diverted cash yields φ < 1 units
of private beneﬁt, while each unit of diverted input yields βφ units of private
beneﬁt, where β ∈ [0, 1).10 We interpret φ as the level of creditor vulnerability
(creditors are better protected if φ is small), whereas β is a measure of input
liquidity. When β is large, the input can be transformed into private beneﬁts
almost as easily as cash. If β is small, the input cannot easily be diverted.
An input can have low liquidity for several (related) reasons: It may have a
very speciﬁc application (like special purpose machinery), it may be easy for
creditors to monitor use and resale transactions, or the input may have a low
second–hand value.
If φ = 0 there is no diversion opportunity. If legal protection of creditors
were perfect in this sense, it would always be possible to fund ﬁrst–best in-
vestment even for a penniless entrepreneur. In order to make our problem
9While looting of companies by insiders is a relevant problem even in the United States,
as documented by Akerlof and Romer (1993), empire building and other milder forms of
opportunistic behavior are probably more important.
10The linearity of the “diversion technology” could be relaxed with no change in the
results. What we need for some of our results is that diversion is never socially desirable.
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interesting, we thus make the assumption that
φ > φ =
pQ(I∗(rB))− I∗(1 + rB)
I∗(rB)
. (2)
In other words, diversion yields a private beneﬁt in excess of the average rate
of return to ﬁrst–best investment.
As already indicated, both banks and suppliers are competitive. Banks oﬀer
contracts {(LB, DB(pQ, LB))}, where LB is an amount of cash (the principal)
that the bank is willing to lend to the entrepreneur and DB is the associated
repayment obligation. In principle, the repayment can be made conditional on
the size of the loan, LB, and on the veriﬁable return from investment, pQ(I).
Thus, we do not rule out, for instance, external equity ﬁnance. What we do
rule out is a contract that depends directly on the investment I or the input
purchase q. In reality, banks may try to contract on input purchases, but it is
costly to monitor that the clause is being adhered to. The practice of using
sight bills, quite common a century ago, illustrates that bank monitoring is
possible but costly. Suppliers would ship inputs to some port, with the bank
as recipient. The bank would inspect the goods, making sure that quality and
quantity were in accordance with the contract, and if so agree to pay for them.
The buyer would then obtain the goods in return for taking a loan from the
bank. The rate of interest would reﬂect the bank’s substantial administrative
costs. Of course, this procedure could also entail unfortunate delays for the
buyer. To highlight the distinction between trade credit and bank credit we
here assume that these monitoring costs are prohibitive. For simplicity, we
also assume that lending is exclusive, in the sense that the entrepreneur may
not borrow from multiple banks or multiple suppliers at the same time.11 A
particular kind of contract is the overdraft facility {(L, (1 + rB)L)}L≤L¯, which
speciﬁes a credit line L¯ and a constant interest rate rB. We shall start out by
assuming that all banks oﬀer overdraft facilities, but this is without any loss
of generality. As we show below, no other contract can upset an equilibrium
in overdraft facilities.
Similarly, suppliers oﬀer contracts of the form {(LS, DS(pQ, LS, q), q)},
where LS is an amount of trade credit and DS is the repayment obligation.
Again, the contract is exclusive and does not specify I. It is, however, ob-
viously possible to condition the contract on the input purchase, since the
supplier costlessly obtains this information. This is the crucial diﬀerence be-
tween trade ﬁnance and bank ﬁnance.
11Without this restriction, the same equilibrium payoffs could be sustained through a
variety of constellations of lenders, each providing a certain part of the external finance.
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Observe that contracts cannot be conditioned on each other. For example,
a loan oﬀer by a bank cannot be conditioned on the amount of trade credit
accepted by the entrepreneur. One justiﬁcation for this assumption is that
it is costly to verify contracts with third parties. (Even if the legitimacy of
a voluntarily disclosed contract can be veriﬁed, it is much harder to verify
the absence of additional contracts which undo the eﬀects of the disclosed
contract.) Moreover, the assumption buys simplicity and does not drive our
main results.
The sequence of events is as follows.
1. Banks and suppliers simultaneously make their contract oﬀers.
2. The entrepreneur chooses among the contract oﬀers.
3. The entrepreneur chooses LB, LS and q.
4. The entrepreneur makes the investment/diversion decision.
5. The payoﬀ realizes and repayments are made.
We characterize the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes of this game.
3 Pure bank ﬁnance
In order to highlight the various features of the model, it is useful to ﬁrst
consider the case in which trade credit is unavailable. Showing that the model
generates conventional credit rationing due to moral hazard in this setting
is helpful for evaluating the additional results that are generated once trade
credit is introduced.
Suppose for simplicity that banks have access to unlimited funds at con-
stant marginal cost ρ. Competition among banks then drives their equilibrium
proﬁts to zero. Nonetheless, banks do not lend unlimited funds, because a suﬃ-
ciently large loan tempts the entrepreneur to divert all the resources—in which
case the bank would make a loss.
To make this insight precise, suppose for a moment that banks are con-
strained to oﬀer overdraft facilities. Deﬁne
Lu = min{I∗(rB)− ω, L¯}. (3)
If the entrepreneur abstains from diversion, the overdraft facility is utilized
up to the point Lu. That is, a non–diverting entrepreneur either borrows
enough to make the ﬁrst–best investment or fully exhausts the credit line.
Borrowing more (less) means that the marginal return on the investment is
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smaller (greater) than the marginal cost of funds. However, the entrepreneur
is assumed to be opportunistic, so investment cannot be taken for granted.
Once the entrepreneur gains access to the overdraft facility, he chooses I, q,
and L to maximize utility,
U = max{0, pQ(I)− (1 + rB)L}+ φ[β(q − I) + (ω + L− q)], (4)
subject to the constraints
q ≤ ω + L,
I ≤ q,
L ≤ L¯.
The ﬁrst term is the residual return from investment, taking into account
the entrepreneur’s limited liability. The second term is the private beneﬁt
associated with diversion of inputs and cash respectively. Inspection of the
problem reveals that the entrepreneur never ﬁnds it optimal to divert only a
fraction of inputs, i.e., to choose q > I > 0. This option is dominated either
by I = q or by I = 0. Another dominated option is to divert only a fraction
of available cash, i.e., to have ω +LB > I > 0. Once the entrepreneur plans to
repay the loan in full, the marginal beneﬁt from investment is at least 1 + rB,
which is larger than the marginal beneﬁt from diversion φ. If, on the other
hand, the entrepreneur were to invest too little to repay the loan in full, there
is no point in investing any resources at all, since any additional return would
be claimed by the bank. Thus, diversion is essentially an all or nothing choice,
the entrepreneur behaving prudently if and only if his residual return from
investing exceeds the payoﬀ from diverting all funds. That is, the credit line
L¯ has to satisfy the “global incentive constraint”
pQ(ω + Lu)− (1 + rB)Lu ≥ (ω + L¯)φ. (5)
Since diversion and hence default do not occur in equilibrium, the equilib-
rium interest rate must be rB = ρ, as this is the only interest rate that yields
zero proﬁt for the banks. It remains to determine the equilibrium credit limit
and consequent investment.
Proposition 1 For any pair of parameters (φ, p) satisfying our assumptions,
there exists a critical wealth level ωˆ(φ, p) > 0 such that entrepreneurs with
less wealth than ωˆ are credit constrained and invest strictly less than I∗(rB).
Entrepreneurs with more wealth than ωˆ borrow less than their credit limit and
invest I∗(rB).
To ﬁnance ﬁrst–best investment, a poor entrepreneur with ω < ωˆ would need
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to borrow substantially. The resulting large repayment obligation would leave
him with a residual return below the payoﬀ from diverting all available funds.
Consequently, his credit limit constrains investment and is given by the binding
incentive constraint
pQ(ω + L¯)− (1 + rB)L¯ = (ω + L¯)φ. (6)
(Lemma A1 in the Appendix shows that this constraint is binding for all wealth
levels close enough to zero.) The credit limit cannot be lower in equilibrium.
Otherwise, there would exist a contract with a higher limit and a higher in-
terest rate that would be preferred by the bank as well as the constrained
entrepreneur. By contrast, wealthy entrepreneurs need to borrow less money
in order to fund ﬁrst–best investment. With a small repayment obligation the
residual return from investment exceeds the diversion payoﬀ, and hence the
entrepreneur’s investment is unconstrained.
If the credit limit does not constrain investment, there is some ambiguity as
to what the equilibrium credit limit would be. There is an interval of possible
credit lines that yield the same utility for the entrepreneur. We resolve this
issue by focussing on the equilibrium in which the banks oﬀer the maximum
credit line, as given by the solution to the incentive constraint under ﬁrst–best
investment,
pQ(I∗(ρ))− (1 + ρ)(I∗ − ω) = (ω + L¯)φ. (7)
Our main results do not depend on this tie–breaking choice. Notably, the
equilibrium payoﬀs are unique. The assumption merely relieves us of the need
to distinguish binding credit lines from non–binding ones when describing trade
credit supply.
The equilibrium credit line has the following properties.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium credit line L¯ is increasing in wealth (ω) and
in the output price (p), and is decreasing in creditor vulnerability (φ) and in
the interest rate ρ.
An increase in wealth lowers the entrepreneur’s borrowing requirement and
hence increases his residual return for a given investment level. It also in-
creases his residual return for a given loan size, making larger repayment in-
centive compatible. As a result, the supply of credit (the credit line) increases
in wealth. Both higher proﬁtability and better lender protection increase the
opportunity costs of diversion. Hence, larger repayment obligations and thus
higher credit limits become incentive compatible. Finally, a higher bank inter-
est rate lowers the entrepreneur’s residual return for a given loan size. Thus,
the credit line must be reduced in order to maintain incentive compatibility.
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Actual lending varies in a more complicated way than does the credit line.
Although a wealth shock aﬀects the credit line of all entrepreneurs in the same
manner, its impact on credit varies across poor and wealthy entrepreneurs. If
all entrepreneurs become wealthier, those entrepreneurs that are credit con-
strained can and do borrow more, whereas unconstrained entrepreneurs borrow
less.
These parameter changes also aﬀect which entrepreneurs are credit con-
strained, i.e., the threshold ωˆ. The eﬀect is ambiguous for those parameters
that move both the equilibrium credit line and the ﬁrst–best level of invest-
ment. For example, an increase in the interest rate tightens the credit line and
lowers the ﬁrst–best investment level. Hence, the threshold ωˆ may go either
up or down (See Lemma A2 in the Appendix).
The restriction to credit line contracts is immaterial for all the above re-
sults.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium overdraft facility is an optimal contract.
Another contract would only outperform the overdraft facility if it were to en-
able an entrepreneur with wealth below ωˆ to invest more. A larger investment
is feasible only with a larger principal, which in turn requires a larger repay-
ment (otherwise the bank incurs a loss). However, such a larger repayment
obligation violates the entrepreneur’s incentive compatibility constraint. To
prove this, consider an optimal general contract {L, D(pQ, L)}. In order for
there to be any investment at all, the contract must satisfy the global incentive
constraint pQ(ω + L) − D(pQ, L) ≥ φ(ω + L). The crucial term is the total
repayment D. Given that banks do not accept to lose money, total repayment
cannot be lower than (1 + ρ)L. But this is exactly the repayment implied by
the overdraft facility. Since the global incentive constraint is the only binding
constraint in the case of an overdraft facility, the latter is indeed an optimal
contract.12
4 Bank ﬁnance and trade credit
When suppliers can extend credit, a new trade–oﬀ emerges. On the one hand,
the use of trade credit improves the investment incentive because the supplier
12An optimal contract also has to guard against partial diversion, i.e., have the property
that pQ′(I)[1 − D′1(pQ, L)] ≥ φ. This constraint never binds in equilibrium under a debt
contract, since (by definition) D′1 = 0 and rational investment implies pQ
′(I) ≥ 1 + rB ≥ φ.
Partial diversion can be a problem under other contracts, such as an equity contract, where
repayment is an increasing function of returns (D′1 > 0). (Typically, when entrepreneur
moral hazard is the problem, equity can outperform debt only if the return from investment
is uncertain.)
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lends inputs, which are less easily diverted than cash. Unlike the bank, the
supplier can also condition the supply of trade credit on the total purchase
volume. On the other hand, the entrepreneur has more diversion opportunities.
As before, the entrepreneur may divert cash. In addition (or alternatively),
the entrepreneur may now divert inputs. This option was dominated above,
because all inputs had to be paid in cash. With trade credit, it becomes
possible to cheat the supplier as well.
To facilitate the analysis, let us now normalize ρ, the bank’s cost of capital,
to zero. Also, let us assume for simplicity that the suppliers’ marginal cost of
funds is constant at some rate r > 0.13 Since trade credit will ease the bank
credit constraint, we also need to strengthen our earlier parameter restriction.
We now assume that
φ > φ(β) =
pQ(I∗(r))− [1 + (1− β)r]I∗(r)
βI∗(r)
. (8)
Otherwise, even a penniless entrepreneur could fund ﬁrst–best investment.
By the same reasoning as above (Proposition 2), we may without loss of
generality conﬁne attention to credit lines L¯B and L¯S(q). Since competition
drives the proﬁts of banks and suppliers to zero, we know that equilibrium
interest rates are 0 and r respectively. We shall say that the bank credit
limit is binding if I∗(0) > L¯B and that the trade credit limit is binding if
I∗(r) > L¯B + L¯S(I∗(r)).
Because r > 0, the entrepreneur only utilizes trade credit in equilibrium if
he is suﬃciently tightly rationed in the bank credit market. More precisely,
trade credit is desired at an interest rate r if and only if L¯B+ω < I
∗(r). Suppose
that L¯B is such that this inequality holds. If the entrepreneur abstains from
diversion, he purchases inputs q = ω + LB + LS and utilizes trade credit
LuS = min{I∗(r)− L¯B − ω, L¯S}. (9)
That is, a prudent entrepreneur takes just enough trade credit to sustain the
ﬁrst–best investment level given the marginal cost of funds, r. If ﬁrst–best
investment is beyond reach, the prudent entrepreneur invests as much as the
credit lines allow.
As noted above, investment cannot be taken for granted. The entrepreneur’s
problem after having accepted the contract oﬀers of one bank and one supplier
13If the suppliers were to have lower costs of funds than the banks, there would be no
bank credit in our model. Of course, any supplier who faces a binding bank credit constraint
indeed has a higher opportunity cost of funds.
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is to choose q, I, LB, and LS to maximize his utility
U = max{0, pQ(I)−LB − (1 + r)LS}+ φ[β(q− I) + (LB + LS + ω− q)] (10)
subject to the constraints
q ≤ ω + LB + LS,
I ≤ q,
LB ≤ L¯B,
LS ≤ L¯S(q).
As in the case of bank credit only, the entrepreneur never ﬁnds it optimal to
divert a fraction of inputs or cash. Consequently, there are only two relevant
temptations facing the entrepreneur. First, he may exhaust the available trade
credit only to divert all inputs and any remaining cash. This temptation is
only resisted (in favor of investing in the project) if
pQ(L¯B + L
u
S + ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)LuS ≥ φ[βq + (L¯B + L¯S + ω − q)].
The left hand side of the inequality is the entrepreneur’s maximum return from
investment; the right hand side is the entrepreneur’s return from borrowing a
maximum amount and then diverting all resources.14
A noteworthy property of this expression is that any transformation of
cash into input reduces the value on the right hand side. Hence, the maximum
incentive compatible trade credit limit is increasing in q and reaches its maxi-
mum when all funds are used to buy inputs. We refer to this maximum trade
credit limit as L¯S, which is deﬁned as the solution to the equation
pQ(L¯B + L
u
S + ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)LuS = φβ(L¯B + L¯S + ω). (11)
The second relevant temptation is not to purchase any inputs at all (in which
case the supplier does not oﬀer any trade credit, so LS = 0) and to divert the
cash ω + L¯B. The entrepreneur abstains from diverting all cash only if
pQ(L¯B + L
u
S + ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)LuS ≥ φ(L¯B + ω). (12)
Hence, the equilibrium credit limits are determined by the incentive constraints
(11) and (12).
14Since revenues are verifiable, the bank can claim project returns even if all the bank’s
money has been diverted. Thus, diverting all resources dominates diverting some (or all) of
the bank loan and investing some (or all) trade credit.
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As we have already noted, suﬃciently wealthy entrepreneurs do not utilize
trade credit. As wealth decreases, some trade credit is used, and the investment
level is determined by the ﬁrst–order condition
pQ′(I)− (1 + r) = 0.
Eventually, for the poorest entrepreneurs, both bank credit and trade credit
are fully exhausted.
Proposition 4 For given parameters (β, φ, p) there exist critical wealth levels
ω˜1 > 0 and ω˜2 > ω˜1 such that: (i) entrepreneurs with wealth above ω˜2 take
no trade credit and invest I ∈ [I∗(r), I∗(0)]; (ii) entrepreneurs with wealth
inbetween ω˜1 and ω˜2 take trade credit and invest I
∗(r); (iii) entrepreneurs with
wealth below ω˜1 exhaust both bank and trade credit limits and invest less than
I∗(r).
The investment of entrepreneurs with wealth above ω˜2 is unaﬀected by the
availability of trade credit, because they can already invest I∗(r) or more.
However, all entrepreneurs with less wealth than ω˜2 would have invested less
than I∗(r) if trade credit was unavailable. In general, these entrepreneurs
invest more when trade credit is available than if bank credit is the sole source
of funds. Compared to the pure bank lending regime, the introduction of trade
credit therefore increases eﬃciency.
Regarding the supply of bank credit, as given by the bank credit limit
L¯B, the comparative statics are qualitatively the same as under the pure bank
lending regime. Higher wealth and output price increase bank credit supply,
and higher creditor vulnerability decreases it. As one might suspect, the impact
of these parameters on the trade credit limit is analogous. Thus, our model is
comfortingly consistent with the evidence of Petersen and Rajan (1997) that
the supply of trade credit is positively related to various measures of overall
creditworthiness. The positive co–movement between the two credit limits is
in fact completely general, because both limits are also decreasing in input
liquidity and in the trade credit interest rate.
Proposition 5 (i) For an entrepreneur with wealth smaller than ω˜1 the equi-
librium credit lines L¯B and L¯S are increasing in the output price (p) and in
the entrepreneur’s wealth (ω) and are decreasing in the creditor vulnerability
(φ), in the input liquidity (β), and in the trade credit interest rate (r). (ii)
For ω ∈ [ω˜1, ω˜2), the same results hold, except that L¯B is independent of β.
Perhaps the most surprising result is that the supply of bank credit is decreas-
ing in input liquidity and in the trade credit interest rate. After all, neither
of these parameters enter the incentive constraint (12) directly. Bank credit
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is nonetheless sensitive to input liquidity and to the trade credit interest rate,
because the availability of additional trade credit makes investment more valu-
able compared to diversion. Additional trade credit increases the investment
size, and thereby the entrepreneur’s residual return. (Technically, the left hand
side of (12) is increasing in LuS.) By implication, any entrepreneur who is ra-
tioned in the bank is oﬀered more bank credit when trade credit is available
than when it is unavailable. The supply of bank credit and trade credit are
complements.
The complementarity between bank credit and trade credit does not imply
that the proportion between the two is ﬁxed. When β is close to 1, L¯S is close
to zero, so a reduction of β obviously leads to an increase in L¯S/L¯B. However,
this relationship need not be monotonic. While it is diﬃcult to sign the impact
of β on the ratio of trade credit to bank credit, the ratio of trade credit to
investment is unambiguous.
Proposition 6 The ratio L¯S/I is decreasing in β.
The proof is easy. Divide equation (11) by (12) to get
LS = (ω + LB)(1− β)/β.
It follows immediately that the ratio of trade credit to investment is
LS
ω + LB + LS
= 1− β. (13)
The intuition is also straightforward. Input illiquidity increases both credit
limits, but not the entrepreneur’s wealth. This result, that users of illiquid
inputs utilize relatively more trade credit than users of liquid inputs, is a
unique prediction of our model that would be interesting to test.
Proposition 6 also suggests a trade–oﬀ between the ﬁnancing capacity of a
project and its technologically eﬃcient input–mix. Suppose a project requires
several inputs of diﬀering liquidity, and that trade credit is available. Unless
the technology requires inputs in ﬁxed proportions, a ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrm can gain by deviating from the technologically eﬃcient input mix and
rely more on relatively illiquid inputs. The additional credit generated by a
reduction of liquidity compensates for lower productive eﬃciency. Such tech-
nology distortion should be particularly pronounced in countries with poor
legal protection of creditors, since this is where credit limits are more likely
to bind. We are not aware of any study that directly addresses this issue.
However, Claessens and Laeven (2001) document that ﬁrms in countries with
poor property rights protection apply technologies that are more intensive in
tangible capital. This occurs even when the legal structure is such that it
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gives little collateral value to the ﬁxed assets. Since workers in poor countries
(workers are the most common suppliers of intangible assets) are often not in
a position to extend any credit at all, ﬁrms may need substantial bank credit
to fund investment in intangible assets that also tend to deliver slow returns.15
Given that banks are reluctant to lend, it may be better to operate on a larger
scale using a technology that delivers faster returns and uses tangible inputs
that are funded by trade credit.16
So far we have only been concerned with trade credit supply. When supply
is not a binding constraint, we can characterize trade credit demand, i.e., the
use of trade credit by entrepreneurs who are rationed only in the bank credit
market.
Proposition 7 For entrepreneurs with wealth ω ∈ (ω˜1, ω˜2) trade credit uti-
lization LS is decreasing in the entrepreneur’s wealth (ω) and increasing in
creditor vulnerability (φ). The eﬀects on LS of an increase in the output price
(p) or in the trade credit interest rate (r) are indeterminate.
These entrepreneurs borrow up to the bank credit limit and invest I∗(r), which
is independent of both wealth and of creditor vulnerability. Following a change
in either ω or φ, the entrepreneurs continue to invest I∗(r) and compensate
the reduction (increase) in L¯B fully by an increase (reduction) in LS. In other
words, there is only a credit substitution eﬀect. This reasoning does not apply
to variations in the output price or in the trade credit interest rate, because
these parameters aﬀect I∗(r). Therefore there is a credit volume eﬀect as well.
For example, an increase in r leads to a decrease in I∗(r) as well as in LB. The
total eﬀect on trade credit depends on which reduction is larger. Notably, trade
credit can easily be a “Giﬀen good”, in the sense that trade credit demand is an
increasing function of r over some range. This only requires that I∗ is relatively
insensitive to r, in which case the credit substitution eﬀect dominates.
Our theory predicts a sharp diﬀerence in trade credit dynamics depending
on whether the borrower is rationed in the trade credit market or not. For those
that are constrained, bank credit volumes and trade credit volumes move in the
same direction. For those who are not constrained by their trade credit limits,
bank credit and trade credit should often (though not always) move in opposite
directions. When there is a general credit crunch due to a drop in corporate
15If workers can extend credit, our theory says that this should be utilized by capital
constrained firms. Perhaps it is no coincidence that wage payment is delayed more as
workers get richer. The convention in Western countries has moved from payment daily and
weekly, to fortnightly and monthly pay.
16Denis Gromb has pointed out that our model implies that consultancy firms and law
firms should extend substantial trade credit, since these services are highly illiquid.
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wealth, unconstrained ﬁrms that already take some trade credit take more of it.
However, constrained ﬁrms have to reduce their use of trade credit in tandem
with the tighter bank credit limits. This ﬁnding sheds light on the “puzzle”
recently reported by Nilsen (2002) that large US ﬁrms without a bond rating
increase their use of trade credit during monetary contractions more than
unrated small ﬁrms do. This ﬁnding has been considered puzzling because
large ﬁrms are considered to be ﬁnancially sounder and hence supposedly less
dependent on trade credit than small ﬁrms are. We think that this is indeed
true. The crux is that those (often small) ﬁrms that are most dependent on
trade credit cannot increase their trade credit borrowing in recessions because
they already exhaust their trade credit limit. To put it bluntly: The only
thing worse than having to increase trade credit borrowing is to be unable to
do so. Conventional wisdom therefore holds only for the comparison between
rated versus unrated ﬁrms. Firms with bond rating do not need to utilize
costly trade credit even in a recession, so their trade credit volumes should be
cyclical, tracking the change in input purchases.
If unconstrained ﬁrms dominate among those that take trade credit, our
model produces countercyclical swings in trade credit, as has been observed
in US data by Ramey (1992).17 In less developed economies, it is likely that
constrained ﬁrms dominate, in which case trade credit should be pro–cyclical
with respect to wealth shocks. When the cycle is caused by swings in demand
(p) rather than changes in wealth, the predictions are more ambiguous for any
country, because unconstrained ﬁrms may take either more or less trade credit
as demand changes.
As for cross–section variation in trade credit volumes, the model gives clear
implications with respect to entrepreneurs’ wealth and creditor protection.
Proposition 8 The ratio of trade credit to investment is non–increasing in
wealth (ω) and non–decreasing in creditor vulnerability (φ).
For ﬁrms that are constrained in both markets, we know from (13) that the
ratio LS/I depends only on β. For ﬁrms that are only constrained in the bank
credit market, bank and trade credit are substitutes with respect to changes
in ω and φ (Proposition 7). Hence, the ratio of trade credit to investment is
decreasing in ω and increasing in φ. Proposition 8 is broadly conﬁrmed by the
balance sheet data of Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Giannetti (2002), which
indicates that trade credit is more important in countries with worse creditor
protection.18 In Giannetti’s sample of (predominantly) unlisted ﬁrms in eight
17Ramey’s finding is sensitive to data set and method. For example, Oliner and Rudebusch
(1996) do not find a countercyclical movement in trade credit.
18Recent empirical work by Fisman and Love (2001) indicates that the difference in firms’
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European countries, accounts payable constitute on average 29 percent in Italy,
30 percent in France, and 36 percent in Portugal, while being only 11 percent
in Netherlands and 15 percent in the UK.
So far, we have considered an entrepreneur who starts up a new venture, en-
dowed with cash only. Such an entrepreneur cannot oﬀer trade credit, because
there is no output to sell. In order to investigate more closely the supply of
trade credit, let us now consider instead an entrepreneur with a going concern.
For simplicity, suppose that a stock of output with market value ω is the
only asset being left over from last period, once all outstanding debts have
been repaid. If the entrepreneur sells all the output for cash, the situation
is again exactly as depicted above. Suppose now that the entrepreneur can
sell his output ω on credit at an interest rate s. As we have shown, it is
typically not desirable to sell all the output on credit, because some cash
payment is needed to keep customers from diverting. Suppose that a fraction
κ of the output is sold on credit. After the sales transaction the entrepreneur
obtains a cash balance of (1−κ)ω and trade credit claims with a face value of
κω(1 + s). Would the entrepreneur be willing to do this, considering the need
for investment funds? Clearly, the answer depends on whether it is possible
to borrow against the trade credit claims or not. Suppose transactions costs
are zero, and that the trade credit claim is safe and veriﬁable. Then the
entrepreneur can go to the bank and borrow κω(1 + s)/(1 + ρ) against it. If
s > ρ, it is optimal to extend trade credit, because this ﬁnancial investment
does not in any way interfere with the real investment. On the contrary, the
extension of trade credit leaves the entrepreneur with liquid wealth of more
than ω, which in turn increases any credit limits he himself faces. As the
entrepreneur’s own cost of funds is irrelevant for this calculation, the model
readily explains why some ﬁrms both take and give trade credit despite the
fact that the borrowing rate r is sometimes higher than the lending rate s.
If the market for trade bills is frictionless in the sense described above, the
supplier is thus willing to extend any incentive compatible amount of trade
credit as long as the trade credit interest rate is not below the bank rate.
Proposition 9 If trade bills can be funded frictionlessly, suppliers’ wealth does
not aﬀect the supply of trade credit, and the equilibrium trade credit interest
rate equals the bank interest rate.
performance across countries is smaller in industries that rely heavily on trade credit, as
measured by trade credit use in the US. A possible interpretation of their finding is that US
firms’ funding advantage on average is smaller in these industries than in other industries;
i.e., φUS and ωUS are relatively low. Alternatively, these industries rely on sufficiently
illiquid input everywhere, and so do not face binding credit constraints.
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In this frictionless world, the nominal trade credit interest rate could actually
be below the bank rate. If the eﬀective trade credit interest rate equals the
bank rate, no buyer has an incentive to borrow in the bank in order to buy
inputs. Thus, instead of oﬀering a small cash discount that no buyer takes,
the supplier might as well oﬀer net terms only, i.e., including the bank interest
rate in the price to be paid in, say, 30 days. Here, then, is a straightforward
rationale for the widespread use of “net” terms.
An objection to the above argument is that banks are rarely willing to
lend up to the full value of trade credit claims; as a rule of thumb, banks
typically oﬀer only 80 percent (or less) as accounts receivable secured debt
(Mian and Smith, 1992). Within our model, this policy can be explained as a
response to the problem of reckless trade credit extension. If suppliers could
lend fully against receivables, they might be tempted to lift their customers’
trade credit limit beyond the incentive compatible level. Even if there is re-
course, so the supplier is liable for bad bills, reckless lending is a problem,
because the supplier himself may divert resources in anticipation of the cus-
tomers’ non–payment. This temptation is reduced if the bank caps lending
against receivables.19 Thus, the extension of trade credit could be limited by
the ability to collateralize receivables. A credit constrained entrepreneur might
thus prefer to invest scarce resources in the business rather than in receivables.
This potentially explains why unproﬁtable ﬁrms extend more trade credit (as
documented by Petersen and Rajan, 1997).20
In a competitive market, equilibrium trade credit interest rates are not
driven by the ﬁnancial status of a single supplier. The trade credit interest
rate increase above the bank rate only if the suppliers collectively are credit
rationed. This is our explanation for why trade credit terms are so similar
within industries, and so heterogeneous across industries and countries (Ng et
al., 1999; Marotta, 2001).
19Even if the supplier sets recklessly high trade credit limits, not all customers will take
all the credit and default. By diverting resources despite the borrowing cap of 80 percent
the supplier forgoes 20 percent of the revenue from the sound trade credit claims. Hence,
the cap improves the supplier’s incentive to lend prudently.
20A factor offers a potential circumvention of the trade–off between supplying trade credit
and making business investments. Factoring offers instant payments against the trade bills,
and heavily constrained entrepreneurs therefore prefer factoring to receivable secured debt.
Of course, as our model suggests, factoring requires that the entrepreneur gives up some
control of the credit granting and the credit enforcement process. (Otherwise, the incentive
to engage in reckless lending is too strong.) The associated monitoring by the factor is costly,
so in this case the supplier also faces a trade–off between trade credit extension and real
investment. We refer to Mian and Smith (1992) and Sopranzetti (1998) for closer discussions
of factoring.
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In conclusion, then, trade credit should be provided independently of sup-
pliers’ characteristics as long as reckless lending can be controlled at a low cost.
Only when reckless lending (or strategic default by buyers more generally) is a
suﬃciently large problem at the industry level should these characteristics start
to matter, with ﬁnancially strong and relatively unproﬁtable ﬁrms extending
more trade credit.21
5 Final remarks
Suppliers lend goods and banks lend cash. This simple observation has been
shown to provide a coherent explanation for the existence of costly trade credit
in competitive credit and product markets. Confronting the theory with broad-
brush evidence from previous studies, we think it stands up well. In future
work we hope to investigate empirically the additional predictions that the
theory generates.
There theory itself might also be extended in several directions. An obvi-
ous extension is to admit multiple periods. Such a model has the potential to
explain, among other things, why bank credit is routinely rolled over, whereas
trade credit is not. The reason is that the illiquidity of inputs is temporary.
Once the input is transformed into output and sold for cash, the funding ad-
vantage of the supplier disappears. Hence, the duration of trade credit should
be no longer than the time it takes to produce and sell. An overdraft facility,
on the other hand, may be in principle be rolled over, because cash is equally
liquid at any point in time. We are hopeful that our distinction between liquid
and illiquid lending is fundamental enough to have implications for bankruptcy
priority rules, but this extension requires the introduction of uncertain project
outcomes, so that bankruptcy becomes an equilibrium phenomenon. Another
topic for future research is the relationship between input liquidity and the
boundaries of ﬁrms.
21If reckless lending is an extremely severe problem and suppliers are poor, we do not
expect trade credit. Other forms of input–related bank lending, such as sight bills (mentioned
in Section 2) could then emerge instead.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 is proved in the main text, with the exception of the existence
and uniqueness of ωˆ(φ, p).
Lemma A1: There exists a unique threshold ω = ωˆ(φ, p) > 0 such that
L¯ + ωˆ = I∗(rB) and pQ(L¯ + ω)− (1 + rB + φ)L¯− φω = 0.
Proof: Recall that the credit line L¯ is given by the binding incentive constraint
pQ(L¯ + ω)− (1 + rB)L¯− φ(L¯ + ω) = 0.
Observe that the constraint is only binding if pQ′(L¯ + ω)− (1 + rB + φ) < 0.
(Otherwise L could be increased without violating the incentive constraint.)
In order to show that there is a unique value of ω such that ω+ L¯(ω) = I∗(rB),
it suﬃces to show (i) that 0 + L¯(0) < I∗(rB) and (ii) that L¯ is (continuously)
increasing in ω. Part (i) follows immediately from our assumption that φ > φ
(equation 2). Part (ii) is established by diﬀerentiating the incentive constraint,
to get
[pQ′(I)− (1 + rB + φ)] dL¯ + [pQ′(I)− φ] dω = 0,
or equivalently,
dL¯
dω
= − [pQ
′(I)− φ]
[pQ′(I)− (1 + rB + φ)] .
The numerator is positive, because pQ′(I) ≥ (1 + rB) by the ﬁrst–order con-
dition, and φ < 1. As shown above, the denominator is negative whenever the
incentive constraint binds. 
Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2: The equilibrium credit line L¯ is increasing in wealth (ω) and
in the output price ( p) and decreasing in the ease of diversion (φ) and the
interest rate ρ.
Proof: The proof that dL¯/dω > 0 is provided in (the proof of) Lemma A1.
Totally diﬀerentiating the bank credit limit with respect to L¯ and p yields
dL¯
dp
= − Q(L¯ + ω)[
pQ′(L¯ + ω)− (1 + rB + φ)
] .
From the proof of Lemma A1 we know that the denominator is negative,
and hence dL¯/dp > 0. Totally diﬀerentiating the bank credit limit with respect
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to L¯ and φ yields
dL¯
dφ
=
(L¯ + ω)[
pQ′(L¯ + ω)− (1 + rB + φ)
] < 0.
Finally, totally diﬀerentiating the bank credit limit with respect to L¯ and ρ,
recalling that ρ = rB, yields
dL¯
dρ
=
L¯[
pQ′(L¯ + ω)− (1 + rB + φ)
] < 0.

In the pure bank lending regime, the threshold level of wealth has the
folloing properties.
Lemma A2: The critical threshold ωˆ(φ, p) increases with the ease of diversion
(φ), while a change in either the output prices ( p) or in the interest rate ( rB)
has an indeterminate eﬀect on ωˆ(φ, p).
Proof: Substituting L¯ = I∗(rB) − ωˆ into the binding incentive constraint
that deﬁnes ωˆ, we obtain pQ(I∗(rB)) − (1 + rB)L¯ = φ(L¯ + ω), which can
be rearranged as pQ(I∗(rB)) − (1 + rB + φ)I∗(rB) + (1 + rB)ωˆ = 0. Totally
diﬀerentiating with respect to ωˆ and φ yields
dωˆ(φ, p)
dφ
=
I∗(rB)
(1 + rB)
> 0.
Totally diﬀerentiating pQ(I∗(rB))− (1 + rB + φ)I∗(rB) + (1 + rB)ωˆ = 0 with
respect to ωˆ and rB yields
dωˆ(φ, p)
drB
=
[(1 + rB + φ)− pQ′(I)]dI∗(rB)drB + (I∗(rB)− ω)
1 + rB
.
From the proof of Lemma A1 we know that [(1 + rB + φ) − pQ′(I)] > 0 and
hence that the ﬁrst term is negative. As the second term is positive, the overall
sign is indeterminate. Similarly, totally diﬀerentiating with respect to ωˆ and
p yields
dωˆ(φ, p)
dp
=
[(1 + rB + φ)− pQ′(I)]dI∗(rB)dp −Q(I∗(rB))
(1 + rB)
,
which is also indeterminate. 
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Proof of Proposition 4
Proposition 4 is proved in the main text, except for the existence and unique-
ness of ω˜1(β, φ, p) and ω˜2(β, φ, p). Also we need to show that ω˜2(β, φ, p) >
ω˜1(β, φ, p). To prove these properties (and subsequent comparative-static re-
sults), it is helpful to deﬁne the function
h(I) = pQ′(I)− [1 + r + β(φ− r)].
The following result is will be used repeatedly.
Lemma A3: For all I < I∗(r), h(I) < 0.
Proof: When both credit limits bind, (11) and (12) become
pQ(L¯B + L¯S + ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)L¯S = φβ(L¯B + L¯S + ω) (14)
and
pQ(L¯B + L¯S + ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)L¯S ≥ φ(L¯B + ω). (15)
It follows that
L¯S =
1− β
β
[L¯B + ω].
Thus, L¯B + L¯S + ω = I = (L¯B + ω)/β. Substituting into (15) and rearrang-
ing, we have the following expression for the maximum incentive compatible
investment level:
pQ(I)− [(1 + r)(1− β)− β(1 + φ)]I + ω = 0. (16)
By virtue of being maximal, the expression must have a negative derivative,
i.e.,
pQ′(I)− [(1 + r)(1− β)− β(1 + φ)] < 0.
Slight rearrangement yields the desired result. 
We now complete the proof of Proposition 4 by establishing the existence
and uniqueness of ω˜1(β, φ, p) and of ω˜2(β, φ, p) and ω˜2(β, φ, p) > ω˜1(β, φ, p).
Lemma A4: For any φ > r there exists a pair of threshold values ω˜1(β, φ, p),
ω˜2(β, φ, p) such that
i) pQ(L¯B + ω)− L¯B − φ[L¯B + ω] = 0 for ω = ω˜2(β, φ, p),
ii) pQ(L¯B + L¯S + ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)L¯S − φ[L¯B + ω] = 0 and pQ(L¯B + L¯S +
ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)L¯S − φβ[L¯B + L¯S + ω] = 0 for ω = ω˜1(β, φ, p),
iii) ω˜2(β, φ, p) > ω˜1(β, φ, p) > 0.
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Proof: Part i): The threshold ω˜2(β, φ, p) is the smallest wealth such that the
entrepreneur can fund I∗(r) using bank credit alone. The proof of existence
and uniqueness of this threshold is analogous to the proof of Lemma A1 and
hence omitted.
Part ii): The threshold level ω˜1(β, φ, p) is the smallest wealth that admits
investing I = I∗(r) using both bank and trade credit. Since (16) gives the
maximum investment level for a given level of wealth, the threshold level of
wealth must satisfy
ω˜1(β, φ, p) = [β(1 + φ) + (1− β)(1 + r)]I∗(r)− pQ(I∗(r)). (17)
The threshold exists and is unique if both L¯B and L¯S are increasing in ω.
Totally diﬀerentiating (14) and (15) and solving yields
dL¯B
dω
= −pQ
′(I)− [(1− β)(1 + r) + βφ]
h(I)
> 0
and
dL¯S
dω
= −1− β
h(I)
> 0,
where the inequalities follow directly from Lemma A3. Thus, both credit limits
are increasing in ω.
Part iii) It follows from φ > r that [β(1 + φ) + (1 − β)(1 + r)] < (1 + φ)
and hence ω˜2(β, φ, p) > ω˜1(β, φ, p). Finally, ω˜1(β, φ, p) > 0 follows from the
assumption that φ > φ(β).
The threshold levels have the following properties.
Lemma A5: The critical threshold ω˜1(β, φ, p) increases with the ease of di-
version (φ) and the input liquidity (β), while a change in either the output
prices ( p) or in the interest rate ( r) has an indeterminate eﬀect on ω˜1(β, φ, p).
Proof: Diﬀerentiation of (17) yields
dω˜1(β, φ, p)
dφ
= βI∗(r) > 0,
dω˜1(β, φ, p)
dβ
= (φ− r)I∗(r) > 0,
dω˜1(β, φ, p)
dr
= [β(1 + φ) + (1− β)(1 + r)− pQ′(I)]dI
∗(r)
dr
+ (1− β)I∗(r),
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and
dω˜1(β, φ, p)
dp
= [β(1 + φ) + (1− β)(1 + r)− pQ′(I)]dI
∗
dp
−Q(I∗(r)).
From Lemma A3 we know that [β(1 + φ) + (1 − β)(1 + r) − pQ′(I)] > 0 and
hence that the ﬁrst term of dω˜/dr is negative. As the second term is positive,
the overall sign is indeterminate. Similarly, the sign of dω˜/dp is indeterminate.

Lemma A6: The threshold ω˜2(β, φ, p) increases with the ease of diversion (φ)
and decreases with the interest rate ( r), while a change in the output prices
( p) has a indeterminate eﬀect on ω˜2(β, φ, p).
Proof: The threshold ω˜2 is given by
pQ(I∗(r))− (1 + φ)I∗(r) + ω˜2(β, φ, p) = 0,
and since the investment is maximal, we have that pQ′(I∗(r)) − (1 + φ) < 0.
Diﬀerentiation yields
dω˜2(β, φ, p)
dφ
= I∗(r) > 0,
dω˜2(β, φ, p)
dr
= [(1 + φ)− pQ′(I)]dI
∗(r)
dr
< 0,
and
dω˜2(β, φ, p)
dp
= [(1 + φ)− pQ′(I)]dI
∗
dp
−Q(I∗(r)).
As for dω˜2/dp, the sign is indeterminate, because the ﬁrst term is positive and
the second term is negative. 
Proof of Proposition 5
Proposition 5: (i) For an entrepreneur with wealth smaller than ω˜1 the equi-
librium credit lines L¯B and L¯S are increasing in the output price (p) and in
the entrepreneur’s wealth (ω) and are decreasing in the creditor vulnerability
(φ), in the input liquidity (β), and in the trade credit interest rate (r). (ii)
For ω ∈ [ω˜1, ω˜2), the same results hold, except that L¯B is independent of β.
Proof: We start by proving part (i). For entrepreneurs with ω < ω˜1(β, φ, p)
the bank and trade credit limits are given by (14) and (15). Diﬀerentiating
these two equations with respect to L¯B, L¯S, and p yields (after some manipu-
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lation)
dL¯B
dp
=
−βQ(I)
h(I)
and
dL¯S
dp
=
−(1− β)Q(I)
h(I)
,
which are both positive (the denominators are negative by Lemma 3).
The proof that dL¯B/dω > 0 and that dL¯S/dω > 0 is already provided in
Lemma A4.
Diﬀerentiating the (14) and (15) with respect to L¯B, L¯S, and φ yields
dL¯B
dφ
=
(L¯B + ω)β
h(I)
and
dL¯S
dφ
=
(L¯B + ω)(1− β)
h(I)
,
which are both negative by Lemma A3.
Diﬀerentiating (14) and (15) with respect to L¯B, L¯S, and β yields
dL¯S
dβ
= − [L¯B + L¯S + ω] [pQ
′(I)− (1 + φ)]
h(I)
and
dL¯B
dβ
=
[L¯B + L¯S + ω] [pQ
′(I)− (1 + r)]
h(I)
.
By Lemma A3, the denominator h(I) is negative, and so is the numerator of
dL¯S/dβ. The numerator of dL¯B/dβ is positive, because pQ
′(I) > 1 + r at
I < I∗.
Diﬀerentiating (14) and (15) with respect to L¯B, L¯S, and r yields
dL¯B
dr
=
βL¯S
h(I)
and
dL¯S
dr
=
(1− β)L¯S
h(I)
,
which are both negative by Lemma A3.
Part (ii) of Proposition 5 is proved in similar fashion. For entrepreneurs
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with ω ∈ [ω1(β, φ, p), ωˆ2(β, φ, p, )) bank and trade credits are given by
pQ(L¯B + LS + ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)LS − φ[L¯B + ω] = 0
and
pQ′(L¯B + LS + ω)− (1 + r) = 0.
The comparative static results are established by totally diﬀerentiating these
two equations. We omit the details, except noting that β no longer appears in
any of the expressions. 
5.1 Proof of Proposition 7
Proposition 7: For entrepreneurs with wealth ω ∈ (ω˜1, ω˜2) trade credit uti-
lization LS is decreasing in the entrepreneur’s wealth (ω) and increasing in
creditor vulnerability φ. The eﬀects on LS of an increase in the output price
(p) or in the trade credit interest rate (r) are indeterminate.
For changes in φ and ω we prove an even more precise result.
Lemma A7: Following an increase in the ease of diversion (φ) entrepreneurs
with ω ∈ (ω˜1, ω˜2) fully substitute the reduction in bank credit (supply) with
trade credit, i.e.,
dL¯B
dφ
=
∣∣∣∣∣dLSdφ
∣∣∣∣∣ .
Proof: For entrepreneurs with ω ∈ (ω˜1, ω˜2) bank and trade credit demand are
independent of β and given by
pQ(L¯B + LS + ω)− L¯B − (1 + r)LS − φ[L¯B + ω] = 0 (18)
and
pQ′(L¯B + LS + ω)− (1 + r) = 0. (19)
Diﬀerentiating (18) and (19) with respect to L¯B, LS, and φ yields
[pQ′(I)− (1 + φ)] dL¯B + [pQ′(I)− (1 + r)] dLS − [L¯B + ω]dφ = 0
and
pQ
′′
(I)dL¯B + pQ
′′
(I)dLS = 0.
Solving yields
dL¯B
dφ
= − [L¯B + ω]
(φ− r) < 0.
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
Lemma A8: Following an increase in wealth, entrepreneurs with ω ∈ (ω˜1, ω˜2)
fully substitute trade credit with bank credit.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating (18) and (19) with respect to L¯B, LS, and ω yields
dL¯B
dω
= − [pQ
′(I)− (1 + r)]
[pQ′(I)− (1 + φ)]
dLS
dω
− [pQ
′(I)− φ]
[pQ′(I)− (1 + φ)]
and
dLS
dω
= −
[
1 +
dL¯B
dω
]
.
Solving yields
dL¯B
dω
=
1
(φ− r) − 1 > 0,
and
dLS
dω
= − 1
(φ− r) < 0.

Finally, we show that the eﬀect of changes in p and r are indeterminate.
Lemma A9: Following an increase in the trade credit interest rate r, en-
trepreneurs with ω ∈ (ω˜1, ω˜2) may demand more or less trade credit.
Proof: Diﬀerentiating (18) and (19) with respect to L¯B, LS, and r (and
solving) yields
dL¯B
dr
=
[pQ′(I)− (1 + r)] /pQ′′(I) − LS
(φ− r) < 0
and
dLS
dr
=
LS
(φ− r) −
[pQ′(I)− (1 + φ)]
pQ′′(I)(φ− r) ≷ 0.

Lemma A10: Following an increase in the output price ( p), entrepreneurs
with ω ∈ (ω˜1, ω˜2) may demand more or less trade credit.
Proof: Totally diﬀerentiating bank and trade credit demands with respect to
L¯B, LS, and p (and solving) yields
dL¯B
dp
=
Q(I)
(φ− r) −
[pQ′(I)− (1 + r)]
(φ− r)
Q′(I)
pQ′′(I)
> 0
28
and
dLS
dp
= − Q(I)
(φ− r) +
[pQ′(I)− (1 + φ)]
(φ− r)
Q′(I)
pQ′′(I)
≶ 0.

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